A veil of secrecy has always surrounded submarine development and, to some extent, the development of the submarine base. There is a definite lack of historical documentation reflecting the development of our submarine bases. This book attempts to partially alleviate this situation and to preserve vital elements of our submarine history. This then, is the story of one of our submarine bases, the Naval Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

It is impossible to describe every particular event in detail or to cover all the individuals who merited recognition for their contributions to the successful accomplishment of the base’s task. This history has been kept as impersonal as possible, and has been made a record of the teamwork achieved under the aspiring leader- ship of numerous individuals.

This publication provides a short history of the base; however, research continues in an attempt to uncover the actual establishment date of the base. Why has this date been difficult to ascertain? There are several reasons why an establishment date is hard to determine.

For many years it was believed the base was established on 2 February 1920 and Commander Chester W. Nimitz was the first commanding officer. Research has proven this to be incorrect. Nimitz was still serving on board the battleship USS South Carolina (BB-26) in Norfolk, Virginia at the time.

Normally when a base is established the Navy Department will promulgate a General Order, signed by the Secretary of the Navy. Research has failed to uncover such a document for this base.

The base was attempting to develop during the era of disarmament. The World War I experience with the submarine left disturbing residual effects on naval doctrine and policy. It was very clear that this rapidly developing weapon had profoundly altered the conduct of war upon the sea. The submarine had undergone “enormous development” during World War I. It had remarkable qualities of “concealment and surprise.” The submarine had forced changes in capital ship design, in fleet organization, and in tactics. And, Great Britain could not forget their narrow escape from certain disaster inflicted by German U-boats. With this memory vividly in mind, Great Britain came to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 armed with a proposal to abolish the submarine.

This proposal had the support of American statesmen and their naval advisers. A Navy Department memorandum prepared just before the armistice favored the total suppression of submarines. And this posi- tion was elaborated in a further memorandum prepared for President Wilson in Paris. In this document the American naval staff recommended that “all submarines in the world should be destroyed, and their future possession by any power forbidden. They serve no useful purpose in times of peace. They are inferior to surface craft in time of war except in ability to treacherously attack merchant ships. Civilization demands that naval war be placed on a higher plane and confined to combatant vessels. So long as the submarine exists it will be used in the stress of war to attack neutral trade.”

This radical proposal does not appear to have been considered very seriously in Paris. The French opposed it. Thus, the question was lost during the prolonged hassle of whether the Allies should destroy or distribute the ships of the defeated German Navy.

The outlook for abolishing the submarine dimmed following the Paris Peace Conference. However, when President Harding entered the White House in 1921, he pledged to take steps toward the limitation of armaments. He summoned an international conference to be held in Washington.

During the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament in 1921-22, the future of the submarine was again one of the major problem areas. Once more, Great Britain proposed abolishment of the submarine. However, the attitudes toward the submarine had changed. The admiralties of Japan and Italy found in the submarine promising solutions for certain of their strategic problems. French naval authorities discovered in the submarine a possible solution to their centuries old quest for an inexpensive counterpoise to England’s overwhelming command of the sea. And, naval opinion in the U.S. veered away from the radical proposal supported at Paris. The U.S. had no intentions of giving up the submarine.

So when the Washington Conference assembled in November 1921, all the principal naval powers, except Great Britain, had plans to further strengthen their submarine forces. The Conference would drag on for weeks and weeks. The Conference halted the armaments race and achieved much in limiting capital ships and aircraft carriers, but it failed to agree to limit submarines in any way.

Another side note of this Conference, Japan proposed the U.S. “agree not to increase the fortifications or naval bases at Guam, the Philippine Islands, and Hawaii.”

Treaties initiated at the Washington Conference were due to expire in 1936 and, in 1930, the main naval powers met in London to try to reach agreement on what was to follow it. Since the Washington Conference the British had never ceased to advocate the total abolition of the submarine and this was still their vow when the delegates assembled in London. But once again, Great Britain failed to secure the abolition of the submarine at the London Naval Conference.

The aforementioned events should provide the reader with a better insight into the political environment which existed during the postwar years of World War I. Precisely what impact those tumultuous years of dis- armament talks cast upon the early development of the base is not known. Certainly the overall effect could have delayed the promulgation of a Navy Department General Order to establish the base.

Relatively little information was available locally in the early years of the base. The Naval Historical Center and National Archives remain one of our finest assets. Also, it is very possible valuable information was inadvertently lost or destroyed during the disestablishment of the Fourteenth Naval District during the late 1970s. However, despite the adversities, the search continues and the mystery of when the base was established prevails.

The publication of this history could not have been accomplished without the support and assistance of numerous individuals. I am extremely indebted to Dr. Dean C. Allard, Head of Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., and Ms. Elaine C. Everly, Assistant Chief of Navy and Old Army Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.C., for their support of our endeavors and in providing needed materials. Also, to Mrs. Dorothy Fuller, Head Librarian of the Naval Base, Pearl Harbor, for her invaluable assistance in offering material. The Naval Submarine Base Photo Lab provided indispensable support and service. Their expertise supplied an in depth profile of photos from the past and present.

Lastly, my appreciation to Captain George R. Stubbs, Commanding Officer, Naval Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, for his desire to publish this history. Without his support and encouragement, this project could not have been accomplished.

To all, Mahalo!

Ray W. de Yarmin
Curator
Pacific Submarine Museum